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1.  Introduction 
With one of the world’s most rapidly growing economies, the largest population over 
1.3 billion and relatively low level of per capita annual income under USD2000, China 
has become a large potential market for consumption goods, especially for food 
products. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2008, China’s GDP had achieved 
24.95 trillion Yuan (3.56 trillion USD: based on the approximate exchange rate 1USD=7 
Yuan; hereinafter inclusive) at the end of 2007. More importantly, China has shown an 
amazing 10 percent annual increase in the economy in the last two decades. 
Furthermore, the per capita disposable incomes for urban and rural residents in China 
were 13786 Yuan and 4140 Yuan, respectively, as of 2007, both of which showed a 7 
percent annual increase since 1979. Even though it is argued that China’s living 
standards are at relatively low level compared to most developed economies, there 
would nevertheless be considerable latitude for food consumption in the light of these 
growth expectations.  
Another reason why the Chinese market for food is expected to grow rapidly is the 
high Engel coefficient of Chinese households. For urban households, the Engel 
coefficient is 36.3 percent in 2007, while it is 43.1 percent for rural households. 
Although these numbers have dropped dramatically since 1979, they are still at a higher 
level compared to those of developed countries, such as the US (13.74 percent in 2005), 
Great Britain (17 in 2007), Japan (23.49 percent in 2007) and Germany (20 percent in 
2007). Domestic per capita food consumption is rising slightly over time, but the trends 
differ by urban and rural areas. The urban residents increased their average food 
consumption from 2914 Yuan in 2005 to 3112 Yuan in 2006 and 3628 Yuan in 2007. On 
the other hand, the per capita food consumption of rural residents increased from 1162 
Yuan in 2005 to 1217 Yuan in 2006 and 1389 Yuan in 2007. In general, the food consumption in China is rising. In a considerably long period, food 
consumption would still play an important role in the Chinese households. There is 
rising demand for quantity due to the rising household income, however, it is not only 
the quantity but also the quality of which the demand is rising in China. Nowadays, 
people want to consume food products which are healthier, more nutritious, and even 
more stylish. Take the urban residents in 2007 as an example, and we notice that only 
7.7 percent of per capita food consumption goes to the staple food, such as grains, rice, 
and corn, which implies that urban residents tend to spend more money on non-staple 
food, such as meat, eggs, and dairy products, etc. On the other hand, with the fast pace 
of globalization and China’s entry to WTO, more foreign products are available in 
Chinese market, and people are willing to try new food products from the western 
world other than traditional Chinese food. Wine is one of these products.  
China is a newcomer and latecomer to wine production and consumption. The wine 
production began to arise only in the late 1980s, but has grown rapidly in recent years. 
Compared to the traditional Chinese hard distilled liquor, wine production and 
consumption remain at low levels. In 2003, China produced 350,000 tons of wine, but 
that only accounted for about 1 percent of the country's total alcohol production 
(Huang, et al., 2009). As for wine consumption, per capita wine consumption in China is 
only 0.3 liters as of 2005, which is much lower than the numbers of the US (12 liters), 
Japan (3 liters) and France (59 liters) (GAIN Report CH6809, 2006). However, the urban 
residents show greater interest in consuming wine products that their average 
consumption of wine in 2005 is approximately 1 liter. Wine consumption, especially 
imported wine, rarely exists outside of major urban areas. Therefore, we can see an 
enormous potential for wine consumption in China, especially in major urban areas. 
There are three primary reasons: first, urban residents are more likely to have higher 
disposable income, so they might stand a greater chance to consume high quality 
products; second, it is easier for urban residents to see and purchase wine products; 
third, most of the existing wine consumers are living in the urban areas.  Most of the demand for wine is satisfied by domestic wine producers, such as the 
Great Wall and Dragon Seal. Even though the domestic wine products do not hold a 
good reputation, the overall quality has been improved in the past years. Imported wine 
products can also be easily found in supermarkets, upscale hotels, and restaurants, still 
the market share of imported wine remains at a low level. Chinese wine imports in 2003 
constituted slightly more than 12 percent of domestic production (Huang et al, 2009). As 
we discussed earlier, it is expected that there is good opportunity for imported wine 
products. However, understanding the local markets and consumer preference for wine 
products is important for foreign wine producers.  
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) is the maximum amount a person would be willing to pay or 
exchange for a good. There are several methods available to estimate consumer WTP 
for novel goods or changes in the qualities of existing goods, such as Dichotomous 
Choice Questions, Choice-based Conjoint Analysis, and Experimental Auctions (Lusk and 
Hudson, 2004). Experimental auctions are becoming a popular method to elicit 
consumer WTP because evidence that consumers respond differently in hypothetical 
and real environments.  
The main objective of this article is to elicit the WTP of both student and resident 
consumers in Beijing and Shanghai for four different wine products which are originated 
in China, France, USA, and Australia, respectively, by using a second-price sealed-bid 
auction mechanism that was first developed by Vickrey (1961). Furthermore, the paper 
will also examine how the WTP elicited are affected by some socio-demographic factors. 
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows. We first describe our experimental 
auction method and data collected through the auction process in Section 2. Section 3 
discusses an empirical model used to analyze the data, and the results are presented. In 
Section 4, we draw some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Method and Data 
2.1 Second-price Sealed-bid Auction There are several advantages and drawbacks of using experimental auction to elicit 
consumer WTP for novel goods or services However, some of these drawbacks can be 
mitigated by conducting experiments in a field rather than lab setting (Lusk and Hudson, 
2004).  
Some studies focus on the effects of different auction mechanisms on the elicited 
consumer WTP. Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) investigate the effect of several 
procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Their results 
indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, BDM and 
random nth price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random nth 
price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM. Perry and Reny (2002) give 
some new insights and comments on and efficient auction, developed by Vickrey (1961). 
Their interest lies in modifying Vickrey’s auction so that efficiency does obtain even 
when the bidders’ values are interdependent, while maintaining Vickrey’s assumptions 
that the goods for sale are homogeneous and that each bidder’s demand is downward 
sloping. Lusk, et al. (2000) conducted both first-price and second-price auctions for corn 
chips made with non-genetically modified ingredients to elicit consumer WTP. Results 
suggest that the second-price auction induces a greater percentage of marginal bidders 
to offer a positive bid than first-price auction. However, their results also indicate that 
average bid levels in the 1
st and 2
nd price auctions were not statistically different from 
one other. Shogren, et al. (2001) evaluate how three auction mechanisms – BDM, the 
second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction – affect the measurement of 
WTP and WTA measures of value. Their experiments show that while initial bidding 
behavior does not contradict the endowment effect concept, the effect can be 
eliminated with the repetitions of a second-price or random nth-price auction. Their 
findings also suggest that auction mechanism itself can account for the conflicting 
observations in Kahneman et al. (1990) and Shogren et al. (1994a).  
In our study, a second-price sealed-bid multi-round auction mechanism is selected. 
And the experimental design is described as follows. 
2.1.1 Organization Beijing and Shanghai are the two largest cities in China, and are always considered to 
be major markets for western foods, including wine products. Considered as a healthier 
alternative to the traditional Chinese liquor, wine products are widely provided in 
supermarkets, liquor stores, hotels, and restaurants, etc. So, our study focuses on two 
cities, Beijing and Shanghai. 
The experimental auction covered a five-week period from May 11th to June 7th, 
2009, and all of the auctions were conducted on the weekends. This is because people 
who stay at home during the daytime of week days are mostly senior or unemployed, 
which would generate sampling bias in the structure of participants. The participants 
included college students from three major universities and residents from seven 
communities in Beijing and Shanghai. 
    It is noted that this experiment is a field experiment, which is different from the one 
conducted in the laboratory, and the circumstances are complicated and difficult to 
control. Moreover, except for college students, the resident participants were showing a 
significant difference in ages and education levels. 
    In addition, 10 college students were hired and trained as assistants during the 
auction process. They helped the auctioneer maintain order, collect sealed bids from 
participants, and collect the questionnaires. 
2.1.2 Experimental Subjects 
All the participants in this experimental auction were recruited from 7 randomly 
chosen communities and 3 major universities in Beijing and Shanghai. The total number 
of participants is 423, in which 195 are residents and 228 are students.  
For the students, they signed up for the experimental auction through an online 
registration system, which has been established by the three universities for economic 
experiment recruitment. They could sign up for the time period which was appropriate 
for them, with the limit of 30 participants per time period, so totally we had 9 different 
time periods for students. After students gathering in each time period in the one 
classroom, the students were randomly divided into two small groups.  For the residents, the recruitment was more difficult and complicated. We first 
contacted the community offices and asked help from the staff in the office. Having 
received the permission from the community offices, we put up advertisements of 
recruitment in the community where the advertisement was open to public. Once the 
residents saw the ad and were interested in the experimental auction, they could stop 
by the community office and sign up for the appropriate time period. Since we could 
only find one meeting room in each community, each two consecutive time periods 
would be considered as a pair wise comparison group, just as the two groups in the 
same time period for the students. As we had expected, the size of groups varied from 
10 to 15, since some participants did not show up. Each participant received a 30 Yuan 
(Chinese currency) show-up award for taking part in the experimental auction. 
For a pairwise comparison group, one of the two groups would take part in the 
auction with information exposure while the other without information. Before the 
auction started, the auctioneer would read the experiment instructions and simulated 
how the bidding process would proceed. If no questions were asked, the auction got 
started. 
    2.1.3 Items for Auction 
The items for auction are four bottles of wine from 4 different origins (France, 
Australia, U.S., and China). The wine products are described in Table 2.1. To make the 
results comparable, we used the same four wine products across all the groups. The 
wine was purchased at the Carrefour Supermarkets in both Beijing and Shanghai. When 
they were displayed at the auctions, each bottle had a label indicating the origin of 
production. During the auction process, the participants were free to hold the wine in 
his/her hands and inspect the labels for the corresponding products. Discussion and 
talking were strictly prohibited during the auction, so that the participants would not be 
influenced by each other and make their own decisions. 
2.1.4 Multi-round Auction without Information exposure 
Firstly, we will do auction without information exposure for one group. The subjects 
only understand that the items they are going to bid for are wines from different origins, however, the auctioneer do NOT in detail give any introduction to what the differences 
between them. All the participants in each group will be given three offer sheets.  
Each subject can only look at their own offer sheets, bidding (both price and quantity) 
for the four bottles of wine all by themselves. To avoid collusion, talking with other 
participants is strictly prohibited during the auction procedure. As for the offer sheet, 
the quantity is either zero or one, and the price must be greater than zero (accuracy 
RMB 1 Yuan).  
All bidders submit the price and quantity for the first round. The bidding price for the 
first round cannot be zero because we need our experiment to reflect consumers’ 
different preferences over the four bottles of wine, i.e. the bidding price difference must 
be identified even at lower prices. The concern is that some bidders will be likely just to 
take the 30 Yuan show-up award and not participate in the auction procedure. Then, the 
auctioneer announces the highest prices for all of the items, and this highest price from 
the first round will be the starting prices for the second round. Then at the end of the 
second round, the auctioneer announces the highest prices for all of the items. Similar 
to the first round, the highest prices for the second round will be the starting prices for 
the third round. And then we go for the third round. Here we only do a three-round 
auction. 
In the second and third rounds, the participants may choose to offer zero bids. If one 
has offered zero bids in the second round, he can still offer greater-than-zero bids in the 
third round, but these bids should be based on the highest bids from the second round. 
And the participants may also choose to offer zero bids for some of or all of the wine 
products.  
Finally, the bidder offering the highest price wins the auction, but this bidder will only 
buy the item he won in auction at the second highest price, i.e. second price auction. 
For example, the highest three bidding prices for the wine from China are RMB50, 
RMB49 and RMB48; therefore the bidder offering RMB50 will win the auction and buy 
this item at the price of RMB49. If the quantity for one item is 2 or more at the highest price, a drawing method will 
be used to determine the winner. 
Each group of participants takes part in one and only one auction. 
The auctioneer will only announce the winner and the deal price (the second highest) 
at the end of each auction, but no other prices are announced. The winner pays the deal 
price and takes the item, while others have no any other revenue or loss.  
At the end of the experiment, the experimental subjects are required to complete a 
corresponding questionnaire. 
Once all the participants have completed the questionnaires, another group will 
proceed to the next session. 
2.1.5 Multi-round Auction with Information exposure 
Secondly, we will do the auction with information exposure. Before the auction starts, 
the participants will read a brief introduction to the wine grapes and wine products 
from different origins. Based on the same rule as in the auction without information 
exposure, we conduct the auction once again for one group. The information sheet is 
attached in the appendix. 
2.2 Data 
2.2.1  Dependent Variable Summary statistics 
In our study, the highest bids of the three rounds for each participant on four auction 
items are considered as the consumer WTP for these wine products, and we have the 
following summary statistics for the consumer WTP for the four wine products, noted as 
China, US, France and Australia respectively. 
The summary of the constitution of participants is given in the Table 2.3.     
According to this table, our experimental design is a two-way factor design. We 
consider information (with/without information) and role (resident/student) as two 
factors that will affect the means of highest bids for all participants in the auction 
experiment. We take China, US, France, and Australia as four dependent variables, by 
conducting a two-way factor ANOVA. The results show that 
1)  There are no significant interaction effects between information and role for all the four dependent variables. 
2)  The main effect of information is significant at 0.10 level for dependent variable 
Australia, which the main effects of information factor are all significant at 0.05 
level for other three dependent variables.  
3)  There are no significant main effects of role factor for dependent variables US and 
France. However, the main effect of role is significant for China (at 0.05 level) and 
Australia (at 0.10 level). 
2.2.2 Description of Variables 
    See Table 2.4 for the description of both response variables and predictor variables. 
 
3. Data analysis and results 
3.1 Missing Data Problem 
In our data set, some of the entries of independent variables, which were collected 
through the ex post questionnaires, cannot be observed.  
The most pressing concern regarding missing data is the extent to which the missing 
information influences study results. Yet because the data are missing, it is difficult to 
determine the impact of the data that might have been present in the study. There are 
two aspects of missing data that can provide us with clues regarding the extent of the 
influence of the missing information on study results (McKnight et al., 2007). First, the 
amount of missing data is related to its impact on research conclusions. Under most 
conditions, data sets in which large amounts of data are missing result in smaller sample 
sizes and potentially unrepresentative samples of the population to which we wish to 
generalize. Further, the available data for the remaining sample might reflect a bias, 
thus resulting in biased parameter estimates and misleading statistical conclusions. 
Second, the actual process that causes missing data can affect the validity of the 
inferences made from the analysis. Depending on the causal origin, missing data can 
have dramatic influences on the validity of study findings. 
Being consistent with Little and Rubin (2002), the assumption that missingness 
indicators hide true values that are meaningful for analysis will be made throughout this article. When this assumption applies, it makes sense to consider analysis that 
effectively predict, or “impute” the unobserved values. On the other hand, if this 
assumption does not apply, then imputing the unobserved values makes little sense. 
Before using specific techniques to do the data analysis with missing values, we have 
to identify the missing data pattern, which describes which values are observed in the 
data matrix and which values are missing, and the missing-data mechanism, which 
concerns the relationship between the missingness and the values of variables in the 
data matrix. Multiple imputation provides a useful strategy for dealing with data sets 
with missing values. Instead of filling in a single value for each missing value, Rubin's 
(1987) multiple imputation procedure replaces each missing value with a set of plausible 
values that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute. These multiply 
imputed data sets are then analyzed by using standard procedures for complete data 
and combining the results from these analyses. No matter which complete-data analysis 
is used, the process of combining results from different imputed data sets is essentially 
the same. This results in statistically valid inferences that properly reflect the 
uncertainty due to missing values. 
The SAS multiple imputation procedures assume that the missing data are missing at 
random (MAR), that is, the probability that an observation is missing may depend on the 
observed values but not the missing values. These procedures also assume that the 
parameters q of the data model and the parameters f of the missing data indicators are 
distinct. That is, knowing the values of q does not provide any additional information 
about f, and vice versa. If both MAR and the distinctness assumptions are satisfied, the 
missing data mechanism can be ignored. The MI (Multiple Imputation) procedure 
provides three methods for imputing missing values and the method of choice depends 
on the type of missing data pattern. For monotone missing data patterns, either a 
parametric regression method that assumes multivariate normality or a nonparametric 
method that uses propensity scores is appropriate. For an arbitrary missing data pattern, 
a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method that assumes multivariate normality can 
be used. 3.2 The MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) Method 
The MCMC method originated in physics as a tool for exploring equilibrium 
distributions of interacting molecules. In statistical applications, it is used to generate 
pseudo-random draws from multidimensional and otherwise intractable probability 
distributions via Markov chains. A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables in 
which the distribution of each element depends only on the value of the previous one. 
In MCMC simulation, one construct a Markov chain long enough for the distribution of 
the elements to stabilize to a stationary distribution, which is the distribution of interest. 
By repeatedly simulating steps of the chain, the method simulates draws from the 
distribution of interest. In Bayesian inference, information about unknown parameters 
is expressed in the form of a posterior probability distribution. MCMC has been applied 
as method for exploring posterior distributions in Bayesian inference. That is, through 
MCMC, one can simulate the entire joint posterior distribution of the unknown 
quantities and obtain simulation based estimates of posterior parameters that are of 
interest. 
By applying the MCMC method procedure, the MI procedure assumes that the data 
are from a continuous multivariate distribution and contain missing values that can 
occur on any of the variables. It also assumes that the data are from a multivariate 
normal distribution when either the regression method or the MCMC method is used. 
The SAS MI and MIANALYZE procedure also assume that the missing data are missing at 
random (MAR), that is the probability that an observation is missing can depend on the 
observed values, but not on the missing values (Rubin 1976; 1987). The MAR 
assumption is not the same as missing completely at random (MCAR), which is a special 
case of MAR. Under the MCAR assumption, the missing data values are a simple random 
sample of all data values, and the missingness does not depend on the values of any 
variables in the data set. 
Furthermore, the MI and MIANALYZE procedures assume that the parameters of the 
data model and the parameters of the model for the missing data indicators are distinct. If both the MAR and the distinctness assumptions are satisfied, the missing-data 
mechanism is said to be ignorable (Rubin 1987; Schafer 1997). 
 
3.3 Multiple Imputations and Regression Results 
3.3.1 Multiple Imputations by MCMC Method   
    In our practice, we generate 3 imputed data sets to be used later in the regression 
analysis. 
First of all, when applying the MCMC method, we use the EM (Expectation 
Maximization) estimates as a starting value with which to begin the MCMC process 
(Schafer 1997).  Second, the missing data pattern shown in Table 3.1 lists 8 distinct 
missing data patterns. The table shows that the data set imputed by the MCMC method 
does not have a monotone missing pattern. Third, the time-series plots and 
autocorrelation function plots for the means of all variables included in the imputed 
data sets are checked to see if there is autocorrelation in the iterations (Figure 3.1-3.22). 
The plots show no apparent trends for all the variables. 
3.3.2 Check Model Assumptions 
    Since we have four dependent variables (China, US, France, and Australia) in our data 
set, we perform four separate diagnoses for the model assumptions. 
To check the normality of error terms, we apply two formal tests: Shapiro-Wilk test, 
and Anderson-Darling test. The results show that for the four different models all suffer 
a non-normality problem for the error term. Thus, we need remedial measures to 
overcome this problem. Here, the Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variables is 
introduced. The results show that 𝜆𝜆 = 0.25 is the best choice for the transformation 
parameter.  
To test the constancy of error variances, we perform a Breusch-Pegan test for the four 
models. And the results show that the assumption of constancy of error variances is 
satisfied by all the four models. To test the multicollinearity problem, we apply the concept of variance inflation factor 
(VIF). As we can see from the results, the multicollinearity is not a serious problem in 
our data set, since none of the VIF values is greater than 10 (Kutner, etc., 2004).  
The results are shown in Table 3.2. 
3.3.3 Model Selection 
After performing the Box-Cox transformation on the four dependent variables, we 
finally come to the model used in the regression analysis: 
YX βε = +  
Where  
Y is the observation vector of response variable with Box-Cox transformation; 
X  is the observation matrix of predictor variables; 
β  is a vector of regression coefficients; 
ε  is a vector of independent error terms with mean zero and equal variance. 
The table shows the description for both response variables and predictor variables. 
3.3.5 A Two-way ANOVA for Dependent Variables 
    Before we report the estimation results, we first check if the information provided 
and whether the participant is student or resident have influence on their preferences.     
    We consider with or without information exposure (information) and resident or 
student (role) as two factors that will affect the means of highest bids for all participants 
in the auction experiment.  And we take China, US, France, and Australia as four 
dependent variables, so we have the two-way ANOVA results and discussions in Table 
3.3.  All tests are at level of significance 0.05.  
For all the four dependent variables, no significant interaction effect between 
“information” and “role”, so it makes sense to report the main effects of both factors. 
According to ANOVA table, there is strong evidence that the means of highest bids on 
wine products from China, US and France are different between with-information group 
and without-information. And there is strong evidence that the means of highest bids 
on wine products from China are different between resident participants and student 
participants. No other significant difference is detected based on our ANOVA table. Therefore, we can conclude that the information we provided in the experimental 
auction has influence on the participants’ opinions on wine products. 
3.3.5 Estimation Results 
    First, we include all the variables in the model, which is full model, in the parameter 
estimation, and we have the results shown in Table 3.4 for Imputation 1. Then by 
applying the usually used criteria: Collin Mallows C(p), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), 
and BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion), we can decide which variables will be detained 
in the final selected models. See Table 3.5 for the estimation results for Imputation 1. 
Since we have similar results for Imputation 2 and 3 compared to Imputation 1, we only 
report results for Imputation 1. 
According to the parameter estimates, we have the following concluding remarks: 
1)  Although our ANOVA table shows that there is a significant difference between 
the means of highest bids for with-information and without-information groups, 
our estimation results only indicate its positive effect on the participants’ WTP for 
wine from the US. 
2)  Resident participants are showing higher WTP for the wine products than student 
participants, since residents stand a greater chance in earning more money by 
working full time or part time. However, students comparatively have a much 
lower budget constraint and expenditure per capita. 
3)  The household income has a positive effect on the WTP, which could be easily 
explained. The participants with higher household income are more likely to 
consume the so-called “luxury” product, wine, in China. 
4)  The wine products are easily accepted by younger consumers, so the age has 
negative effect on the WTP for wine products from China, US and France. 
5)  An interesting finding lies in the result that there is no significant effect of whether 
the participant is male or female, which implies both men and women consumers 
are equally likely to consume wine products and willing to pay an equivalent price. 
On the other hand, it also verifies the fact that wine is suitable for both men and 
women. 6)  As for the number of family members and education level do not have significant 
influence on consumers’ preference on wine products. 
7)  For the employment status, the results are a bit complicated. For participants who 
have full time jobs are likely to pay less for wine products from China and US. As 
for those who have part time jobs, they are willing to pay less for American wine 
and pay more for French and Australian wines. A situation of unemployment 
would have negative effect on the willingness-to-pay for Chinese wine. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, we apply the second price sealed auction mechanism to study the 
Chinese consumers’ WTP for four wine products, which are from China, the US, France, 
and Australia. One of our goals is to tell the difference of consumers’ preferences 
between the “old world” wines (French) and “new world” wines (Chinese, American, 
and Australian). Our data shows that Chinese consumers in Beijing and Shanghai are 
willing to pay more for the “old world” wines from France than the “new world” wines 
from China, American, and Australia, which indicates their greater sense of identity on 
the French wines. It is so common in Beijing and Shanghai that French wines dominate 
the shelf space for foreign wine products. However, the local Chinese wines also 
account for a considerable market share because of the price superiority, which also 
results in the lowest WTP for Chinese wines in our auction.  
        To deal with the missing data problem in the data set, we use the MCMC (Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo) method. The resident participants show higher WTP than college 
students for all the four wine products in the auctions. Another interesting finding is 
that the participants in the group with information exposure are offering higher bids for 
the wine products. As for the factors that affect the participants’ WTP, younger, male, 
employed, well educated participants are willing to pay more for wine products. 
Furthermore, household income and number of household members are positively 
affecting the WTP of participants for the wine products.      Our results provide meaningful and insightful marketing suggestions for the “new 
world” and Chinese wine producers, such as the target consumers and pricing strategy. 
First of all, the consumers’ sense of identity is important for the new world wine 
producers. Even though the new world wines are of good quality, consumers will not 
buy them if they do not know about the wine. So the information exposure, or in other 
word, communication will play an important role in the wine marketing. This can be 
done in a lot of ways, such as industrial expos, advertising, and promotion. Second, 
different wine products must cater to different needs of consumers, so the producers 
should convey different information on different wine products. Third, pricing strategy is 
another key factor that should be taken into account. The producers not only consider 
their production cost, but also consider the Chinese local market. We notice that the 
mean WTP for the four wine products are all lower than the real market prices, which 
implies that the Chinese wine market is still in its early days. In consequence, high-end 
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 Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 
The Wine Products for Auction 
 
Origin of Production  Brand Name  Year of Production 
China  Dragon Seal  2005 
USA  Chateau Saint Pierre  2005 
France     


















 Table 2.2  
The Constitution of Participants 
 
Counts  With information  Without information 
Residents  96  99 
















 Table 2.3 
The Summary Statistics for Response Variables 
 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median  Range  Highest  Lowest 
China  21.42  27.97  16  217  218  1 
US  23.45  28.66  15  199  200  1 
France  33.64  51.72  20  417  418  1 












 Table 2.4 
The Description of Response Variables and Predictor Variables 
Response Variable 
China 
The highest bid in the three rounds of each participant on the 
wine product from China^0.25 
US 
The highest bid in the three rounds of each participant on the 
wine product from the US^0.25 
France 
The highest bid in the three rounds of each participant on the 
wine product from France^0.25 
Australia 
The highest bid in the three rounds of each participant on the 
wine product from Australia^0.25 
Predictor Variable 
information  1=with information, 0=without information 
role  1=resident, 0=student  
gender  1=male, 0=female 
age  Age of the participant 
income  Monthly household income/1000 
member  The number of family members in the household 
education 
Level of education (0=elementary school or below, 1=high 
school, 2=junior college, 3=undergraduate, 4=graduate) 
fulltime   1=full time, 0=otherwise 
partime  1=part time, 0=otherwise 
unemployed  1=unemployed, 0=otherwise 
retired  1=retired, 0=otherwise Table 3.1 
Missing Data Patterns 
Missing Data Patterns 
Group  ch  us  fr  au  info  role  gender  logage  logincome  member  edu  fulltime  partime  unemployed  retired 
1  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
2  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  X  X  X  X 
3  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  X  X  X  X  X 
4  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  X  X  X  X  X  X 
5  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  X  .  X  X  X  X 
6  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  .  X  X  X  X  X 
7  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  .  .  X  X  X  X 
8  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  .  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
 Missing Data Patterns 
Group  Freq  Percent 
Group Means 
ch  us  fr  au  info  role  gender  logage  logincome 
1  321  75.89  20.753894  21.990654  30.735202  24.149533  0.252336  0.520249  0.436137  1.483385  3.442058 
2  1  0.24  1.000000  1.000000  30.000000  1.000000  0  1.000000  0  1.763428  3.204120 
3  2  0.47  25.500000  32.000000  34.000000  31.500000  1.000000  1.000000  0  1.814858  3.088046 
4  77  18.20  16.636364  19.649351  24.935065  22.090909  0.142857  0.194805  0.597403  1.428079  . 
5  2  0.47  7.000000  5.500000  13.500000  6.000000  0.500000  1.000000  1.000000  1.628359  . 
6  14  3.31  18.785714  20.642857  28.571429  23.928571  0  0.285714  0.571429  1.488953  . 
7  2  0.47  24.000000  29.000000  39.000000  34.000000  0  1.000000  0.500000  1.778151  . 
8  4  0.95  5.500000  5.750000  25.250000  21.000000  0.250000  0.500000  0.250000  .  3.486367 
 Table 3.1 Continued 
Missing Data Patterns 
Group 
Group Means 
member  edu  fulltime  partime  unemployed  retired 
1  3.448598  2.261682  0.208723  0.074766  0.040498  0.199377 
2  3.000000  .  0  0  0  1.000000 
3  .  0.500000  0  0  0.500000  0.500000 
4  3.532468  2.558442  0.025974  0.025974  0.064935  0.077922 
5  4.000000  .  0.500000  0  0.500000  0 
6  .  2.428571  0  0  0.071429  0.214286 
7  .  .  0  0  0  1.000000 











 Table 3.2 
Check for Model Assumption in Imputed Data Sets 
  Test for Normality 
Test for Constancy of 
Variance 
Response Variable  Shapiro-Wilk  Anderson-Darling  Breusch-Pagan* 
China  Pr<0.0001  Pr<0.005    0.4950, 0.5140, 0.5323 
US  Pr<0.0001  Pr<0.005   0.3335, 0.7084, 0.5571 
France  Pr<0.0001  Pr<0.005  0.6414, 0.7416, 0.7242 
Australia  Pr<0.0001  Pr<0.005  0.4472, 0.7524, 0.6101 
*For the Breusch-Pagan tests, the three numbers are corresponding to the 3 imputation 












 Table 3.3 Two-way ANOVA Table for Factors: “Information” and “Role” 
Dependent 
Variables 





Pr > F 
China 
Information  1  3883.9170  3883.9170  5.14  0.0239 
Role  1  6750.4897  6750.4897  8.93  0.0030 
Information*Role  1  2667.7267  2667.7267  3.53  0.0609 
US 
Information  1  6670.5405  6670.5405  8.30  0.0042 
Role  1  1978.4758  1978.4758  2.46  0.1174 
Information*Role  1  929.5479  929.5479  1.16  0.2828 
France 
Information  1  16756.0713  16756.0713  6.39  0.0118 
Role  1  6846.9547  6846.9547  2.61  0.1068 
Information*Role  1  5846.2096  5846.2096  2.23  0.1361 
Australia 
Information  1  4311.0783  4311.0783  2.93  0.0874 
Role  1  5635.8912  5635.8912  3.84  0.0508 









 Table 3.4 
Parameter Estimates (Full Model) 
Imputation: 1 
Parameter  China  US  France  Australia 
Intercept  1.73268*  1.75949*  1.93945*  1.56991* 
Info  0.06854  0.14924***  0.11315  0.09453 
Role  0.34744**  0.42435**  0.47820*  0.37551** 
Gender  0.07628  -0.00118  0.03381  0.00870 
Age  -0.00998**  -0.00882**  -0.01045**  -0.00530 
Income  0.03879*  0.03666*  0.03696*  0.04713* 
Member  0.03074  -0.00090394  0.00617  0.00791 
Edu  0.03739  0.06532  0.04814  0.0441** 
Fulltime  -0.20277  -0.24205***  -0.19053  -0.14167 
Partime  0.01916  0.05732  0.11424  0.16377 
Unemployed  -0.32131**  -0.22489  -0.12403  -0.15136 
*Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 






 Table 3.5 
Parameter Estimates (Model Selection by C(p), AIC, BIC Criteria) 
Imputation 1 
  China  US  France  Australia 
Intercept  2.00106*  1.77207*  2.10640*  1.42697 
Info  -  0.15072***  -   
Role  0.36645*  0.46549*  0.32497*  0.23710* 
Gender  0.08223  -  -  - 
Age  -0.01200*  -0.00964*  -0.00935*  - 
Income  0.03871*  0.03682*  0.03513*  0.04745* 
Member  -  -  -  - 
Edu  -  0.06574  -  - 
Fulltime  -0.21374**  -0.27379*  -  - 
Partime  -  -0.24788***  0.25982**  0.30266* 
Unemployed  -0.33834**  -  -  - 
           *Significant at 0.01 
         **Significant at 0.05 
       ***Significant at 0.10 